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CHAPTER 6
Narrating the “Arab Spring”: Where
Expertise Meets Heuristics in Legislative
Hearings
Tom O’Bryan, Claire A. Dunlop, and Claudio M. Radaelli
Introduction
International reaction to the Arab Spring, explain Freund and Braga (2012,
p. 131), “could be summarized by one word: surprise.” This was the case for
the vast majority of countries, including the United Kingdom (UK) and United
States of America (hereafter US). These countries, so often portrayed as close
allies, encapsulated in the “special relationship” (or, as it has become today, the
“essential relationship”), have long cooperated in foreign policy. There has been
signiﬁcant scholarly and journalistic interest in the reaction to the Arab Spring
of the UK and US executive branches. Yet, in contrast, few scholarly works have
compared and contrasted the foreign policy positions of the legislatures. In this
chapter, we turn the spotlight that way and analyze the discursive responses of
British and American legislators to the Arab Spring over a 13-month period from
April 2011 to May 2012. Speciﬁcally, we compare hearings in the US House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and the UK House of Commons
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Our primary purpose is to understand how narratives were deployed, and
to what effect. Given the role of experts in parliamentary hearings, we are also
interested in how the participation of individuals with technical know-how and
knowledge affects, and possibly corrects, the default (and often false) heuristics
of politicians, or simply suggest different, more evidence-based story frames that,
as shown by experiments, shape cognition (Jones and Song 2014).
Empirically, we draw on coding of the ofﬁcially recorded minutes of three
hearings of each committee, pertaining to the Arab Spring, using the narrative
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policy framework (NPF) (Jones and McBeth 2010). In the remainder of the
chapter we brieﬂy introduce the context in which we use the NPF, and explain
our design, expectations, and data. Then we present our empirical ﬁndings. In the
conclusions, we explain why the experts’ testimonies did not “ﬁx” politicians’
heuristics. We also discuss the differences between the UK and the US, and
suggest implications for future research in this ﬁeld.
Theoretically, this chapter contributes to the NPF in three ways. First, we
consider the insights of cognitive and behavioral sciences—indeed, the ﬁeld is
moving in this direction, as shown by Chapter 1 of this volume. Second, we test
expectations about the evolution of narratives in policy debates, in particular the
expectation that experts correct the bias of elected policy makers. We do not ﬁnd
support for this expectation that is at the root of the system of experts’ testimonies
in parliamentary life, and suggest improvements. Third, we show how the NPF
(a framework where studies tend to be quantitative) can perform equally well in
“qualitative analysis mode”.
The Arab Spring Reaches the US Congress and UK Parliament
There is general consensus that Tunisia was the site of the beginning of the series
of popular uprisings that followed in the region. Situated in front of the munic-
ipal administrative building in the western Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, on
December 17, 2010, 26-year-old fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself
on ﬁre in an act of political resistance that many have argued was “the spark
that ignited the Arab Spring” (Willis 2012, p. 243), leading to the ousting of
Tunisian president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. In the months that followed, and
in the 13 months between April 2011 and May 2012 (the time-frame of this
study), governments were toppled in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, and with protests
in Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Western Sahara, Morocco, and
Bahrain. Table 6.1 provides a timeline of the main events. The underlying root
causes of this movement are still not universally accepted or understood, and as
such the attitudes of American and British legislators should be situated within
this context.
Why examine the responses of representatives and, speciﬁcally, foreign affairs
committees? In what ways do these actors matter? To start with, there are
manifold formal and informal differences between the US House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and the UK House of Commons Select
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Congressional committees, in the House of Rep-
resentatives in particular, hold a great deal of sway as brokers in passing legislation
and have even been labeled “mini legislatures in their own right” (Williams
1998, p. 102). With the direction of the Committee Chair, often referred to
as a “legislative czar” (Storey 2010, p. 313) due to the power they hold, con-
gressional committees enjoy the power to pass resolutions and send legislation to
the Congress, and to formally challenge the powers of the executive branch. For
example, in the 112th Congress, the House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Affairs passed H.R. 109, establishing a national commission to examine
and limit presidential war powers. Their British parliamentary counterparts have
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Table 6.1 Timeline to May 2012
December 2010 Protests sparked across Tunisia by self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi
in central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid
January 2011 Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali ﬂees to Saudi Arabia
January 2011 Mass demonstrations begin in Egypt, centered around Tahrir Square in the
capital, Cairo
February 2011 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak leaves ofﬁce after 18 days of
demonstrations
February 2011 Protests spread to Yemen, Bahrain, Western Sahara and, Libya
March 2011 Protests spread further to Syria, UN Security Council authorizes a no-ﬂy
zone over Libya, and NATO airstrikes begin
August 2011 Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak goes on trial
October 2011 Libyan President Muammar Gaddaﬁ is killed by a mob near his home town
of Sirte, after rebels seize capital Tripoli in August
October 2011 Tunisia holds ﬁrst-ever elections, with Islamist party Ennahda winning
majority
January 2012 US NGO crisis in Egypt, where ofﬁces of organizations such as Freedom
House and the International Republican Institute are raided and staff put
on trial
February 2012 Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh ofﬁcial resigns
May 2012 First round of presidential election in Egypt, where Mohamed Morsi,
eventual winner and representative of Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist
party, challenges Ahmed Shaﬁk
no such legislative power—rather, they produce reports and advice based on a
series of hearings, but they have no ability to force the executive or even the House
of Commons to respond to their ﬁndings. The House of Commons Select Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs does not have the legal ability to subpoena any member
of the executive, or even any single individual, to appear before them. This is true
of all British Parliamentary Select Committees.
However, to merely examine the formal constitutional powers of the British
and American parliamentary and congressional committee system is to ignore the
informal inﬂuence and agenda-setting power that these bodies can wield. This is
particularly the case for House of Commons Select Committees. Stapenhurst
argues that since the establishment of select committees in 1979, the system
“has been a success in providing independent scrutiny of the government” (2008,
p. 88). Despite occasional criticism within Parliament of their role, the Hansard
Society found, in 2001, that a resounding 84 percent of Members of Parliament
(MPs) regarded select committee hearings as “effective in securing information
and explanations from government” (Stapenhurst 2008, p. 88). Flinders also
praises the “active role select committees play themselves in putting issues on
the agenda and acting as a forum for public debate” (Flinders 2002, p. 28). Thus,
while the British committee system may be endowed with comparatively less
formal constitutional powers, these committees have wielded considerable “soft”
power since their establishment.
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Why the Narrative Policy Framework? Research Design,
Expectations, and Data
The NPF (see Introduction to the volume; Jones and McBeth 2010) is a theo-
retical framework in the ﬁeld of public policy analysis. At the outset, the NPF
observes that policy controversies have a narrative structure and more generally
narratives have an important role in how the policy agenda is set, decisions are
made, and policies implemented (see the volume’s Introduction).
Narratives operate at three levels: micro-individual, meso, and the macro level
of culture and institutions (Shanahan et al. 2011, p. 540). In this chapter, we will
look at the meso level. The meso level covers the policy subsystem and the groups
and individuals within that system. Obviously we do not deal with the whole
policy subsystem of foreign policy, but with one important issue (the so-called
Arab Spring) within that system.
The NPF is grounded in three claims. One is that policy problems are socially
constructed by categories and meanings (Shanahan et al. 2011). This is com-
mon to other narrative analysis approaches and the social construction of policy
problems. In public policy processes, problems and issues like the Arab Spring
are socially represented in public discourses and communication. In these social
representations, facts are as important as emotions in the construction of a prob-
lem and the identiﬁcation of the target populations involved in the design of
policy (a point originally made by the literature on social constructions of target
populations; see Ingram and Schneider 1993; see Introduction).
Linked to this concern with social representations, the second major claim of
the NPF is that public policy making is grounded in narratives: by contrast, other
theories of the policy process miss this important “class of variables” (Shanahan
et al. 2013, p. 455). Or, when they refer to social representations, they point
to “frames,” “ discourses,” and “scripts”in general, without acknowledging the
autonomous and speciﬁc functions played by narratives in public policy. A pol-
icy narrative is more structured than a frame (McBeth et al. 2010, p. 392). It is
different from other texts because it contains a clear stance or judgment (on a
policy-related behavior) and (at least one) categorization(s). The latter means that
there is at least a “story character” who is cast as victim, hero, or villain (Shanahan
et al. 2013, p. 457). To illustrate, a discourse theorist like Vivien Schmidt (2008)
would analyze social representations on the basis of coordinative and communica-
tive discourses. But, an NPF theorist would go deeper and ask questions about
what is the narrative form in which a discourse is cast? Who are the heroes and
villains? How does this narrative inﬂuence policy outcomes via its policy stance?
Narratives are therefore the main analytical focus in the NPF. And conse-
quently, the NPF draws on pre-existing strands in policy research in arguing that
actors involved in public policy making mobilize both evidence and emotional
categories in order to persuade and inﬂuence decisions. Typically this is done
by injecting elements of drama and by building doomsday scenarios for their
audience—with the purpose of convincing them that a given course of action is
necessary (see the original elaboration of this element in Roe 1994).
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The third claim is that we can study the nature of narratives and their causal
inﬂuence on public policy empirically. In the Introduction, the editors remark
their difference with post-positivist scholars who argue that narratives are con-
tingent on individual meanings assigned to text and words. There are more
stable patterns generated by belief systems. The NPF is also different from
ethnographic studies about how individuals provide narratives of their lives or
organizations in which they work—in the NPF the focus is on public policy.
We do not see the main difference between the NPF and post-positivist, interpre-
tivist approaches as one of “scientiﬁc standards” versus “non-scientiﬁc standards.”
Rather, it is a different notion of the social sciences or ways of knowing (Moses
and Knutsen 2012). For the NPF scholar, there are explicit, replicable, evidence-
based standards. Socially constructed realities exist, but they can be studied with
objective, transparent, and replicable methods that validate our inferences drawn
from empirical observations. For an interpretivist, social science is about sense-
making. Researchers can judge the quality of sense-making by using standards
like reﬂexivity, trustworthiness, and explanatory coherence (Schwartz-Shea and
Yanow 2012). The NPF, essentially, is a bridge (Shanahan et al. 2013) between
those who believe that narratives matter in public policy making and those who
believe in causality and the empirical nature of the social sciences (Maggetti et al.
2012). It argues that a social ontology can be known by adopting an objective
epistemology (Radaelli et al. 2013).
This has two implications: ﬁrst, it allows the NPF to be in conversation with—
and contribute to—other theoretical lenses on the policy process that adopt a
social ontology and an objective epistemology. Indeed, Radaelli (1999a), in one
of the earliest studies inspired by the same assumptions that now we associate
with the NPF, used narrative analysis to contribute to the development of the
advocacy coalitions framework. Second, the core of the NPF is not whether the
approach to evidence is qualitative or qualitative, but rather whether one believes
that inferences from evidence should be drawn on the basis of objective standards
like validity or reliability. Our chapter examines evidence qualitatively rather than
using statistical analysis—and as such it illustrates this important point.
Speciﬁcally, in the chapter we examine six committee hearings by subscribing
to the claims of the NPF. First, we need to present rival expectations. Foreign
policy analysis points to a special relationship between the US and UK (Burk
2009). If this feature of foreign policy overwhelms the autonomous effects of
narratives, we should ﬁnd limited variation in narrative structures between the
two sides of the Atlantic. There are many reasons why the narratives may be
the same. One is that narratives are epiphenomena: they exist only to provide
discursive fuel to the special relationship. To support the relationship coherently,
they should not vary. In fact, what matters is the special relationship that binds
the two countries: this deep structure of relations should generate more or less
similar narratives of speciﬁc issues like the Arab Spring.
But, what are the expectations if narratives matter, instead? An expectation
about the autonomous causal role of narrative on policy deliberations blends the
NPF with the insights of cognitive and behavioral sciences. Drawing on a large
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literature on the social psychology of experts (Tetlock 2005) and policy design
(Schneider and Ingram 1988), we assume that committee members operate with
cognitive heuristics, such as errors in probabilistic reasoning, false analogies, and
distracting metaphors:
[I]n making predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear
to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction. Instead, they
rely on a limited number of heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments
and sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors.
(Kahneman and Tversky 1973, p. 237)
Given that experts are called in committee hearings to provide evidence, facts,
and reasoned argumentation, we therefore expect their appearance will correct or,
at least, limit the bias caused by these cognitive heuristics. Indeed, this hypoth-
esis is the main rationale for bringing in experts’ testimonies in parliamentary
life. Empirically, it is borne out in the analysis of select committee hearings on
the science-dense issue of bovine tuberculosis (BTB) management. In this case,
Dunlop (2013) ﬁnds experts persistently challenge and correct misunderstand-
ings or myths used by committee members. We call this expectation “narrative
learning.”
For an alternative expectation we enter politics. One can argue that committee
hearings are not used to re-afﬁrm the special relationship. Neither are they used
to produce rational analysis and evidence-based judgment. In politics, hearings
are yet another venue to mobilize political identities, attack the incumbent, and
re-visit the balance of power between the legislative and the executive. They can
also be used to test the balance of power between incumbent and the opposition,
possibly with blame-shifting. One way to shift the blame is the “devil shift,”
originally exposed by Sabatier et al. (1987) and recently tested in the NPF as
narrative device to overstate the power and competences of the “enemy” and
understate the power of the narrator (Shanahan et al. 2013).
In short, policy narratives consist of beliefs, norms, and values as well as polit-
ical narrative tactics (McBeth et al. 2010, pp. 394–395). This third expectation
stresses the latter element. Instead of technicalizing politics—this expectation
argues—the hearings facilitate the politicization of expertise. There is a long tradi-
tion of studies that suggests the many ways in which politics trumps technocracy
(Radaelli 1999b). We call this expectation “narrative politics.”
To summarize:
E1—The narrative structure of committee hearings is the same in the US and the
UK; narratives are determined by the special relationship. In order to be congruent
with the special relationship, they should not vary in the two cases
E2 Narrative learning—Experts’ narratives provide evidence that the hearings are
used to correct bias and wrong heuristics
E3 Narrative politics—Actors deploy narratives in committee hearings to play power,
identity politics, and devil-shift tactics
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To empirically appraise our three expectations, we need a consistent coding sys-
tem to identify and compare narrative themes in the minutes from the committee
hearings. To establish key criteria by which certain elements of discourse can
be categorized, we draw on a previous coding frame developed in the study of
European Union (EU) (Radaelli et al. 2013). Our coding frame is portrayed in
table 6.2. Coding was carried out by the ﬁrst author of the chapter and validated
Table 6.2 Coding framework
Identity Ofﬁcial title or name of the committee hearing.
Lead discourse
genre
What issue or theme does the committee hearing seek to address?
Type What is the formal structure of the committee meeting? Are minutes taken,
testimonies given, or evidence received?
Length Word count transcribed in ofﬁcial minutes.
Initiator Which speciﬁc actor called the speciﬁc hearing in question, and was
charged with identifying and inviting the key witnesses?
Witnesses Which individuals or organizations provide testimony to the committee as
a witness, or invited expert?
Policy problem What is the policy problem that the committee hearing seeks to address, or
ultimately to remedy?
Terms of
reference
Which terms are used to describe to the referent object or subject matter of
the hearing in question? For example, the “Arab Spring” in this instance.
Self-identity How do the committee, and the committee members, deﬁne their own role
and identity?
Types of evidence What is the form, nature, and basis of evidence provided?
Characters Whom are the primary actors constructed through the narrative framework
of the committee hearing?
Causal plot What is the narrative arc(s) played out over the course of the committee
hearing?
Heroes and
villains
Which actors are constructed as “heroes” in a positive light, and which
actors are constructed as “villains” in a negative light?
Metaphors How are metaphors deployed to frame the policy problem or articulated
solutions?
Conﬂict To what extent do committee members, and witnesses, express contrasting
or conﬂicting opinions or accounts?
Types of support
for choice
How are proposed solutions to the policy problem justiﬁed or explained?
What is the form of the supporting evidence presented?
Criteria What criteria, if any, are utilized to judge the appropriateness of a policy
response or solution?
Doomsday
scenario
To what extent are “doomsday” narratives deployed to justify supporting a
certain policy response or solution? To what degree is it stated that a
“disaster” will befall a certain actor/actors if a certain policy response is not
implemented?
Drama To what degree is dramatic tension present in language deployed in the
committee hearing?
Devil shift Does the narrator underplay her power and overstate the power of the
opponent to shift blame away?
Conclusion What concluding remarks are offered to summarize the judgment of the
committee?
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Table 6.3 Minutes of committee hearings
Case ID Committee ID Title Date
1 House of Reps Committee
on Foreign Affairs
Shifting Sands in the Middle
East
April 5, 2011
2 House of Commons Select
Committee on Foreign
Affairs
British Foreign Policy and the
Arab Spring Part 1
November 29, 2011
3 House of Reps Committee
on Foreign Affairs
Reﬂections on the Revolution
in Egypt
February 5, 2012
4 House of Reps Committee
on Foreign Affairs
Assessing US Foreign Policy
Priorities and Needs Amidst
Economic Challenges in the
Middle East
May 9, 2012
5 House of Commons Select
Committee on Foreign
Affairs
British Foreign Policy and the
Arab Spring Part 2
January 31, 2012
6 House of Commons Select
Committee on Foreign
Affairs
British Foreign Policy and the
Arab Spring Part 3
April 18, 2012
by the second author in the spring of 2013. We reassembled all the empirical
material used by the ﬁrst author in the fall of 2013 to check on the robustness of
the coding.
The coding criteria were applied to all six committee hearings, and were com-
piled into six different case records (one per committee), matching the minutes
from the hearings (table 6.3) with the appropriate criteria, resulting in a set of
codiﬁed data. The ﬁndings drawn from this codiﬁcation have been split into
thematic categories relevant for our expectations.
Findings
The Narrative Arc Over Time
At the outset, we describe brieﬂy the different hearings over time, noting how
the narrative changed over time. This gives us information on how the mood
in the committees changed. The maturation or evolution of policy issues and
controversies over time is a classic feature of the NPF (see McBeth et al.
2010 on evolution of wicked issues; see Radaelli et al. 2013 on narrative
arcs): our time-frame is quite narrow and yet we do ﬁnd narrative dynamics.
We will then turn to the expectations with this contextual information in the
background.
In both the US and the UK, we found a shift from “contagious optimism”
(Ramadan 2012, p. 53) to the belief that “the ‘Arab Spring’ may slip into an
Arab Winter” (Noueihed and Warren 2012, p. 302). The narrative arc—that is,
the arc between facts and their policy implications, as implied in a narrative—
moved in synch in the US and the UK. The following terms were used to refer to
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the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in the House of Representa-
tives Committee on Foreign Affairs assembled to take evidence on April 5, 2011.
These were all positive terms of reference:
● “Unprecedented changes” (Case ID 1)
● “Shifting sands in the Middle East” (Case ID 1)
● “Transformative moment” (Case ID 1)
● “Indigenous democratic moment” (Case ID 1)
The ﬁrst hearing that the House of Commons held in response to the protests
came later on in the year, on November 29, 2011. Yet, it appears that at this stage,
the sense of optimism witnessed in Washington, DC (hereafter Washington), in
April about the future direction of the uprisings remained in place:
● “Democratic transition” (Case ID 2)
● “Liberation struggles” (Case ID 2)
● “Arab Spring” (Case ID 2)
Over the course of these two hearings, the term “Arab Spring” was in fact invoked
12 times by US Congressmen and eight times by British MPs. “Spring,” of course,
is a term that invokes positive connotations, associated with a renaissance of sorts,
or a fresh beginning, in the natural world.
However, by the time the two committees reconvened to discuss ongoing
events for a second time, the discursive parameters and terms of reference had
changed dramatically to express increasing skepticism about the chances for
democracy in these transitioning countries. By February 15, 2012, the US House
of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs did not invoke the phrase “Arab
Spring” to refer to the protests on even one single occasion. Rather, the following
terms were used:
● “Revolution” (Case ID 3)
● “Macro-level crisis” (Case ID 3)
● “Not on a path to democracy” (Case ID 3)
This trend extended from Washington to London, with the Select Committee
meeting on January 31, 2012. This was the ﬁrst sign of doubts about the future
direction of the “Arab Spring” countries witnessed in the Select Committee.
While the number of references to the term “Arab Spring” had in fact increased
upon the previous hearing—up from eight to eleven—the term’s invocation was
consistently accompanied by a more negative qualiﬁcation. For example, the fol-
lowing terms referred to by the MPs in question had not featured at the previous
hearing in November:
● “Atrocities” (Case ID 5)
● “Seismic changes” (Case ID 5)
● “Incomplete revolution” (Case ID 5)
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Another interesting feature in the British committee hearing was the use of
metaphors, comparing the uprising in Egypt with the French revolution for
example, whereby one Conservative MP said:
[T]he people at the end of the French revolution were very different from the
people who started it
(Case ID 5)
By the ﬁnal round of committee hearings, pessimism and fatalism about the
future of the Middle East and North Africa was both clear and undivided. That
skepticism is clearest in the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign
Affairs, where powerful negative language was dominant by May 9, 2012:
● “So-called Arab Spring” (Case ID 4)
● “Collapsing” (Case ID 4)
● “Political crisis” (Case ID 4)
● “The region is beset with change” (Case ID 4)
The use of the word “beset” is particularly interesting when juxtaposed with
the term “unprecedented,” with the former used in the ﬁnal hearing and the
latter used in the ﬁrst hearing to refer to the abstract concept of “change” in
the region. While the word “unprecedented” may not necessarily carry posi-
tive connotations, it is certainly more neutral than “to be beset by,” which can
be deﬁned as “being troubled by something or someone persistently” (Con-
cise Oxford English Dictionary 2008, p. 1103). Thus, the shift from what was
perhaps naïve optimism early in the Arab Spring to very clear pessimism in
the discourse of American politicians on the committee in question is clearly
grounded in the empirical data presented above. The House of Commons
shares this trend, with the prevailing discourse ﬁxed around waiting for the
time “when a real transition takes place . . .”—implying that the protests and
upheavals seen in the region were not signiﬁcant enough to trigger meaningful
change.
The metaphors and similes turned pessimistic, for example: “Egypt is on its
way to becoming another Iran” (Case ID 3); “[E]verything you just described
could have been said in 1979 about Iran” (Case ID 3); “[O]ne of the things
that struck me about Egypt when it was sort of hot and heavy there was
the eerie resemblances to Iran in this respect” (Case ID 3). The use of this
simile is a powerful discursive tool, and completes the construction of this
narrative arc among members of the US House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs. The expression “eerie resemblance” also bears witness to
the high degree of negativity in the language. While this particular linguistic
device was not used explicitly by the British MPs, this shared optimism-to-
pessimism over time is certainly also the deﬁning narrative arc of the committee
hearings.
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(How) Do Narratives Vary?
We reject the expectation that only limited differences would be identiﬁed
between the UK and US committees’ discourse for the simple reason that the
very essence of the transatlantic “special relationship” came under attack during
the hearings in the UK. The hearings became a venue to rehearse the mounting
skepticism in the UK of the beneﬁts of a close allegiance with the US in foreign
policy. We found critical opinions in all three hearings of the House of Com-
mons Foreign Affairs Committee. John Baron (a senior Conservative MP) made
this criticism of the US clearest in asking the following question to the panel of
witnesses on November 29, 2011:
[T]o what extent do you think British subservience to US policy [in the Middle
East and North Africa] is a hindrance rather than a help? In certain parts of the
region . . . American foreign policy is not well appreciated.
(Case ID 6)
Baron was not alone, with former Secretary of Defence, Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth
MP and Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell, former Leader of the Liberal Democrat
Party, making the following negative statements about the USA and its policies in
the Middle East:
The relationship with America [in the Middle East] has restricted our thinking’ AQ1
(Case ID 2) and ‘The UK is attached to what is not an utterly becalmed US foreign
policy, which is very disappointing AQ2
(Case ID 6)
Such ﬁery rhetoric, decrying US foreign policy in the Middle East as essentially
narrow-minded and reactionary, represents a radical discursive departure from
the language used under previous governments and in previous parliamentary
sessions. We may reasonably speculate that this is perhaps, in part, a backlash
to the premiership of Tony Blair, where the value of a close alliance with the
US was questioned by the general public, and in particular in the wake of the Iraq
War. Sufﬁce it to say that, this analysis has revealed that there is a good deal of
skepticism among British political elites over the value of the special relationship.
Narrative Learning
We have already encountered a few cognitive shortcuts, comparing the upris-
ings in Egypt with both the French Revolution of 1789 and the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. Recall that heuristics are “judgmental short-cuts, efﬁcient ways to
organise and simplify political choices” (Bowler 2003, p. 30) often via such a case
of association or comparison. Apart from the Egypt–Iran analogy, we found that
dramatic cognitive shortcuts were invoked increasingly often, and ultimately con-
tributed to a highly sensationalist, negative, and uninformed policy discussion.
The question arises: did the witnesses counter this trend by injecting evidence
and knowledge into the hearings?
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As mentioned, the US and UK committees have different powers to call wit-
nesses to provide evidence before them. While the US House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs has the ability to subpoena individuals, its British
counterpart in the House of Commons does not enjoy such powers. Regardless,
for both of these bodies, the evidence of witnesses is crucial to their ﬁndings and
essentially serves as the knowledge base. In a series of hearings on the Arab Spring,
one would expect such a balanced array of individuals and backgrounds to pro-
vide a nuanced and balanced picture of the situation. However, the evidence and
witness base was drastically narrow in terms of experience, nationality, location,
and profession. Table 6.4 provides biographical detail of the individuals who pro-
vided evidence to the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
at the three hearings.
All the “experts” were based in the US, and almost all were ofﬁcial representa-
tives of the US government—for example, through the US Department of State.
The single hearing at which NGO experts were invited to provide testimony came
at a similar time to the US NGO crisis in Egypt, which may, in part, explain their
Table 6.4 Witnesses appearing before the US House of Representatives Committee on F foreign
affairs
Name Position Organization Governmental US-based
Michael
H. Posner
Assistant
Secretary, Bureau
of Democracy
US Department
of State
Yes Yes
Tamara Wittes Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau
of Near Eastern
Affairs
US Department
of State
Yes Yes
Robert Kagan Senior Fellow Brookings
Institute
No Yes
Michele Dunne Director, Middle
East Center
Atlantic Council No Yes
Eric Trager Fellow Washington
Institute for Near
East Policy
No Yes
Jeffrey Feltman Assistant
Secretary of
State, Bureau of
Near Eastern
Affairs
US Department
of State
Yes Yes
Mara Rudman Assistant
Administrator
for Middle East
Bureau
US Agency for
International
Development
Yes Yes
Mark Ward Deputy Special
Coordinator for
Middle East
Transitions
US Department
of State
Yes Yes
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Table 6.5 Witnesses Appearing before the UK House of Commons Select Committee on foreign
affairs
Name Position Organization Governmental UK-based
Intissar
Kherigi
Daughter of
Rachid
Ghannouchi,
(leader of
Tunisian
Ennahda party)
Non-afﬁliated No No (occasionally)
Dr Eugene
Rogan
Director, Middle
East Centre
St Antony’s
College,
University of
Oxford
No Yes
Rt Hon Lord
Malloch-
Brown
Chairman of
Europe, Middle
East and Africa
FTI Consulting No Yes
Rt Hon
Alistair
Burt MP
Parliamentary
Under-Secretary
of State, Middle
East and North
Africa
Foreign &
Commonwealth
Ofﬁce
Yes Yes
Jon Davies Director of
MENA Directorate
Foreign and
Commonwealth
Ofﬁce (FCO)
Yes Yes
invitation. Legislative committee members’ knowledge came almost exclusively
from the executive branch of the US government.
In the committee on the other side of the Atlantic, we have a similar over-
whelming reliance on UK-based sources (table 6.5). While only one of the
hearings features any governmental ﬁgures, there is also only one hearing that
features a foreign national.
However, the main problem relating to the nature of the evidence, testimony,
and witnesses pertains to the relationship between the politicians on one hand,
and the witnesses on the other. As discussed, the policy discussion here is highly
unstable, with policy positions ﬂuctuating rapidly. It is clear that the witnesses
examined by the committees contributed to this instability; they failed to employ
their experience and knowledge to challenge uninformed policy positions. Writ-
ing about Congressional committees over ﬁve decades ago, Maslow argues that
“while occasionally [the witnesses] may be questioned sharply, they are almost
never cross-examined” (1957, p. 12). In this instance, however, the tables are
turned and the “relaxed environment” of which Maslow is so critical is actu-
ally enjoyed by the committee members themselves. When a certain MP or
Congressman draws upon an ill-founded cognitive shortcut, for example, the wit-
nesses who enjoy a degree of expertise on the subject were clearly not correcting
the committee members. Indeed, they consistently expressed simple agreement
with uninformed policy positions. The following excerpt, in table 6.6, from the
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Table 6.6 Congressional Uncorrected Cognitive Shortcut
Rep. Connolly: Just an observation, Dr. Wittes. Everything you just described could have been said
in 1979 about Iran. What you said—I was on the Hill in those days [in 1979]—was eerily
reminiscent of things one could have heard back in 1979 . . . I mean, putting aside all other
considerations, I just wonder if you might comment on that, because, you know, just as they have
domestic politics, so do we, and there is a limit to what we can explain to our constituents.
Dr. Wittes: It is an excellent question, Congressman . . . I think where we are with the Egyptian
military right now is they think our relationship with them is so vital that they can do this, and at
the end of the day we still won’t cut off the aid.
February 2012 hearing of the US Committee (Case ID 3), is indicative of such
uncritical interaction.
Despite Dr Wittes’ academic and policy expertise on the Middle East, as
Deputy Secretary of State, she does not correct the cognitive shortcut made by
Representative Connolly in the use of a simile between the 1979 Iran Revolution
and the future trajectory of Egypt. The Iranian state is inherently religious. The
Muslim Brotherhood is committed to the implementation of Islamist policies,
but through the vehicle of a civil state authority. This stands in stark contrast
to Iran—and highlights the inherent ﬂaw in suggesting that Egypt is on its
way to becoming “another Iran.” While Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood
are Sunni, Iran is Shi’a. This is a difference between Egypt and Iran that any
expert on the region should have instantly identiﬁed and been in a position to
correct.
The same trend, whereby expert witnesses are not using their expertise to cor-
rect the cognitive shortcuts of the committee members, is also found in the House
of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. The quote in table 6.7 is
typical of the politician–witness interaction (Case ID 6).
There are a number of fundamental differences between the French Rev-
olution and the protests in Egypt. First, the French Revolution overthrew a
monarch—Louis XVI—through a public uprising. President Hosni Mubarak
was a former military leader. Religion played different roles in the two uprisings.
The French Revolution was guided by Enlightenment ideals, and advocated for
Table 6.7 Parliamentary Uncorrected Cognitive Shortcut
Mike Gapes MP: Since [the demonstrations in Tahrir Square] the dynamics in Egypt have very
much changed. The Muslim Brotherhood were not in the lead in that but now they are the
dominant force in the new Parliament, so clearly things have moved in the last year. All revolutions
are a process, and the people at the end of the French revolution were very different from the people who
started it.
Rt Hon Lord Malloch-Brown: You are completely right. The attack on the Israeli embassy [in
Cairo] and the dramatic evacuation of the ambassador and his staff shows that the trend is not
good at the moment.
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a diminished role of Catholicism and religion in public life. While Egypt was
not a secular state under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, prior to the Revolution,
political Islam was certainly repressed. The Muslim Brotherhood were banned,
and pushed underground, for much of Mubarak’s tenure as president. Thus, in
contrast to the French Revolution, the Egyptian Revolution and the Muslim
Brotherhood sought to bring religion back to the political sphere and national
policy. This highlights the empirical ﬂaw comparing the Egyptian Revolution
and the French Revolution, and once again this could easily have been corrected
by an expert.
Overall, the extent to which the witnesses support and endorse the unin-
formed cognitive shortcuts of the politicians in question is a problem in both
London and Washington. This is in spite of the clear constitutional differences
in formal power between the two committees, and suggests that the nature of the
problem is more “informal.” Throughout all six committee hearings, witnesses
express not only profound gratitude for having been invited to appear as a wit-
ness, but also agreement with the policy positions of the committee members.
The knowledge and expertise of witnesses invited to provide testimony was not
exploited.
Political Narratives
Evidence for this expectation comes in different forms. One is, obviously,
partisanship and blame-shifting. Consider these dramatic quotes:
[H]ow many more people have to die before the President acts?
(Case ID 1)
[T]he Obama Administration actually was late, I think very late, reading the
writing on the wall in Egypt
(Case ID 3)
[T]he Obama Administration’s response to the brutal crackdown in Syria has been,
in many people’s view, tepid and disappointing
(Case ID 4)
However, as faith in the Arab Spring evaporated over time, Congressmen shifted
the blame away from President Obama. There was a shift in “villainization” away
from the president toward various other actors in the Middle East. There is no
similar trend in Britain, with only one explicit attack made upon the policies or
decisions of the British government.
Another form of politicization revolves around the use of drama and dooms-
day scenarios. These scenarios are powerful discursive tools deployed to justify
exceptional policies. While doomsday scenarios were nonexistent in the hearings
held in London, they were employed several times in Washington, in different
guises, such as the potential increase in terrorist attacks and the destruction of
Israel, designed to goad President Obama into action.
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Interestingly, the former (i.e., terrorism) appeared on the agenda only in the
last of the three hearings under scrutiny here, on May 9, 2012 when, as previously
explained, attitudes toward the “Arab Spring” had faded from optimism to uni-
versal pessimism. Both Republicans and Democrats drew a causal link between
the “upheaval” in the region and a potential surge in terrorist attacks:
[C]ombating terrorism still remains a critical priority. Collectively, the current sit-
uation [post-Arab Spring] poses one of the most serious challenges in the Middle
East that the US has faced in decades . . . Egypt, Libya Tunisia and Yemen are all
struggling to steady themselves . . . radical, violent Islamists are seeking to exploit
the chaos while ever seeking new havens from which they can plan attacks including
attacks on the United States
(Case ID 4)
In terms of political implications, this scenario appeared in the narratives in
May 2012—the same month where debates over the State Department’s For-
eign Assistance Budget began in Congress. Arguably, committee members were
positioning themselves to justify certain changes in aid policy as a consequence of
this doomsday scenario. Indeed, in his opening statement, Congressman Chabot
foregrounded the economic dimension:
[I]f the current trajectory of the region continues unchanged, our assistance
programs to many of the countries in question will have to be re-evaluated
(Case ID 4)
The second doomsday scenario invoked in the hearings of the US House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on the topic of the Arab Spring
pertains to the supposed possibility of the destruction of the State of Israel. Over
the course of the six hearings, Israel was mentioned a remarkable 89 times by
members of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
a mere nine times by members of the UK House of Commons Select Committee
on Foreign Affairs. Israel was continually constructed as a “friend” throughout
the hearings with the discussion of Israel’s destruction present even as early as
April 2011.
For example, Representative Ann-Marie Buerkle denounced the Muslim
Brotherhood for supposedly welcoming hard-line Islamists into the party ranks,
who she describes as “vicious terrorists who continue to deny the very right of
the State of Israel to exist.” (Case ID 1). By the ﬁnal hearing, Representative Jeff
Fortenberry argued that in the wake of the Arab Spring, Israel was threatened by
“apocalyptic threats levied against its very existence [by Islamists]” (Case ID 4).
This observation about Israel brings us to heroes and villains. There are sig-
niﬁcant differences in terms of which external actors are construed as playing a
“positive” role, and others that played a more “negative” role. The Congressmen
and MPs were united in voicing their praise of the protestors of the Arab Spring.
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In particular the youth are singled out, with one US Representative exclaiming
that the young Egyptian protestors who ﬁlled Tahrir Square to demand Mubarak
leave ofﬁce are “are bright, young, educated people with passion who are trying
to remake Egypt into a much more inclusive and participatory kind of society”
(Case ID 3).
Express commitments to support this new generation of democracy-
supporters were made by members of the US Committee, claiming that the
“young people . . . are desperate and frustrated beyond belief at what they see as a
totally autocratic, despotic government. They will continue to push, and we will
continue to help them” (Case ID 1). Thus, the young protestors are described, in
a narrative sense, as a positive inﬂuence and “heroes” of the Arab Spring that the
US will seek to support. Such language is not often invoked to describe protestors,
who Fleras argues are “often reduced to dangerous militants or irrational ideo-
logues” (2011, p. 218). The very notion of protesting is constructed as positive
and pro-democracy, ﬂying in the face of the common wisdom regarding political
elites’ view of protesting as a form of resistance, challenging the status quo and
promoting instability.
Such praise for the protestors of the Arab Spring can also be found in Britain.
However, their focus is more on female participants in the uprisings than young
people per se: Rt Hon Ann Clwyd MP praises women for “the very important role
they played in promoting a democratic transition in Tunisia” (Case ID 6). Fur-
thermore, women are described as “heroic activists” (case ID 5), and most
signiﬁcantly the “extreme circumstances” against which a hero must triumph are
also present in the narrative. It is argued that the heroism of the women protestors
in question is all the more signiﬁcant given how “frustrated and marginalised”
(Case ID 5) the female populations of the Middle East and North Africa are,
with detailed information about women’s conﬁnement to the private realm of
the Tunisian economy also provided in the very ﬁrst hearing under examination
here (Case ID 2). This empirical discovery is also signiﬁcant for it challenges the
notion that, in such political discourse, the “heroes” are more commonly male,
while women are cast as suffering and supposedly in need of protection from said
heroic men. Jackson argues that
. . . the hero narrative is also highly gendered; it evokes the popular entertainment
images of the lone “man’s man” who has to use his masculine qualities to save
innocent women and children from harm. Women are always cast in the role of
potential victims [in political dialogue] and almost never in the role of hero . . .
(2005, p. 79, emphasis added)
In the wake of the Arab Spring, Islamist parties assumed power in Tunisia and
Egypt—Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, respectively. Moghadam argues
that “thus far, even moderate Islamist parties appear wanting in a commitment
to human rights and women’s equality” (2013, p. 204), and protests in Egypt in
particular against the Muslim Brotherhood appear to be gathering pace. Yet, in
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our hearings there appears to be a great level of conﬁdence and optimism among
British MPs about the capacity of these Islamist parties to govern. Labour MP Rt
Hon Bob Ainsworth asks witness Dr Eugene Rogan,
[D]o you think we should be a bit more relaxed about Islamists and sharia law?
(Case ID 5)
Here Ainsworth expresses skepticism over widespread reactions to the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood. His premise stems from the claim that the secular govern-
ments overthrown by protestors in the Arab Spring failed to incorporate cultural
and religious factions into government, in turn failing to meet the demands of the
population and proving unsustainable for the regime. Ainsworth is not alone in
his praise of Islamist parties in the Middle East and North Africa, with inﬂuential
chair of the committee Richard Ottaway MP expressing his “personal opinion
[that] the Muslim Brotherhood were people with whom we could do business,
and that there is nothing to be frightened about” (Case ID 6). Therefore, while
Islamists are not necessarily constructed as true “heroes” in the traditional deﬁ-
nition of the term, positive language is certainly used by politicians on the UK’s
Committee on Foreign Affairs, with general optimism expressed by very senior
members of the Committee about the potential for Islamist parties to govern the
countries involved in the Arab Spring.
By contrast, Islamist parties are very clearly discursively constructed as the “vil-
lains” in the US, with widespread fear and pessimism about the post–Arab Spring
direction of Egypt in particular under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Fre-
quently described as a “concern” (Case ID 3), or as a “threat” (Case ID 3), the
Muslim Brotherhood is posited as potentially “turning the Arab Spring into an
Islamist Winter” (Case ID 4). Indeed, there is no single comment expressing the
possibility of productive relations between the US and the Muslim Brotherhood.
The rationale for this opposition is two-fold, the ﬁrst being that “many ques-
tion the Muslim Brotherhood’s attitude to democracy” (Case ID 3). The second
relates back to the frequent use of dramatic tension and the doomsday scenario
in the US hearings, where a link between the rise of the Islamist parties and ter-
ror attacks on the US is drawn: “. . . violent Islamists are seeking to exploit the
chaos while ever-seeking new havens from which they can plan attacks, including
attacks on the US” (Case ID 4). And so, a narrative is developed whereby Islamist
parties pose both a threat to the democratic transitions of the Arab Spring states,
but also to the national security of the US itself by virtue of terrorism. Islamist
parties clearly are “villainized” therefore, by Congressmen on the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs whereas they are portrayed as partners in democracy by
the British politicians in question.
Turning to identity politics, the US committee sees itself as a foreign policy
actor whereas the British committee constructs its own role as signiﬁcantly more
limited. The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs makes
limited references to itself, and discursively frames the hearings as an “academic”
exercise in investigating the underlying root causes of the Arab Spring. Thus, the
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Committee does not see itself as a foreign policy actor, in and of itself. There
is one occasion when the Committee begins to assert its own role and identity,
although this is very much limited to the domestic policy making sphere in the
United Kingdom. John Baron MP makes the following statement, which reveals
a signiﬁcant amount about the Committee’s self-identiﬁcation:
[W]hat will be important going forward is winning of the story as much as the
winning of the conﬂict. Looking at our track record as a country in [the Mid-
dle East and North Africa], particularly the announcement of recent [Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofﬁce] cuts, although we as a Committee have played a rearguard
action in trying to reverse those and with some success, what is your view on whether
we should be doing more in this regard?
(Case ID 6, emphasis added)
The use of “we as a Committee” provides the linguistic space in which to artic-
ulate the Committee’s conception and deﬁnition of its own role, and the level of
success it has had in this role. Thus, the Committee is deﬁned as opposing cuts in
the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce’s (FCO) budget—in this instance, cuts
to public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab
Spring. There is no reference to an external role of the Committee throughout
the hearings. Rather, it assumes this domestic role not in the formulation of pol-
icy itself, but in applying pressure upon the executive branch of government in
how best to spend the national budget in foreign affairs. It is asserted that the
Committee has been successful in this endeavor. This role is not enshrined in any
codiﬁed body of legislation or law, but the Committee has assumed this mantle of
ensuring, behind the scenes, that the British government remains diplomatically
engaged with the wider world.
The US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs ascribes for
itself a much more assertive and internationally oriented role in the hearings on
the Arab Spring. Of course, we noted earlier that US congressional committees
enjoy signiﬁcantly greater formal power than their British counterparts. However,
the case will be made here that the Committee in question has begun to assert a
role as an independent foreign policy actor extra-constitutionally.
Congressman Steve Chabot begins the very ﬁrst committee hearing address-
ing the Arab Spring, entitled “Shifting Sands: Political Transitions in the Middle
East,” with a US-centric deﬁnition of human rights. Chabot claims that the
activists in the Arab Spring were: “. . . protesting for their own God-given human
and universal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (Case ID 1). This
deﬁnition of human rights can be conceptualized as US-centric since it makes
very clear reference to the United States Declaration of Independence, which
states that “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
those are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” (US Declaration of Inde-
pendence 1776: Section 1). The implicit idea is therefore raised that “human
rights” are an American concept, and that they can be directly transposed from
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the US to the Arab Spring countries. While this is revelatory of the Committee’s
conceptualization of the US on the whole, it does not touch upon our primary
concern at this stage—namely, the Committee’s deﬁnition of its own role in for-
eign affairs. Rep. Ted Deutsch proclaims the power of the Committee to further
human rights internationally through its legislating abilities, highlighting that
[W ]e yesterday introduced bipartisan legislation to impose sanctions on those who
aid in the abuses of the Iranian opposition movement and further human rights
abuses [in wider the Middle East]
(Case ID 4, emphasis added)
Narrative analysis draws attention to the use of “we” when referring to the
Committee—constructing a unitary actor united under one common voice. Rep-
resentative Deutsch believes that the Committee itself is to be praised for the role
it will play in preventing human rights abuses in Iran, for example. The US Con-
stitution confers no such power upon the House of Representatives Committee
on Foreign Affairs, and while not unconstitutional, these rhetorical claims cer-
tainly reveal that committee members themselves are convinced of the ability
of the Committee to act as an assertive foreign policy actor, and promoter of a
supposedly US-centric version of human rights. This is a signiﬁcantly more inﬂu-
ential role than the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
affords itself, discursively.
So What?
Narratives provide meaning to an ambiguous reality, making uncertain circum-
stances amenable to policy intervention. But, actors involved in policy making
manipulate narratives for their own political advantage. Cognitive shortcuts assist
actors in the formulation of a narrative, but if they are not corrected they facili-
tate political manipulation. This chapter has yielded ﬁndings on the relationship
between policy making and narratives by exploring the meso level. Our contribu-
tion to the NPF has been two-fold. On one hand, we have incorporated into the
NPF some basic notions of how the mind works, using the concept of heuristics
and bias of elected policy makers; a key issue in the current NPF agenda (Jones
and Song 2013). The presence of bias is the main rationale for bringing experts
into parliamentary life: the expectation is that they would inform parliamentary
debates and generate learning, or at least reduce bias. On the other, we have con-
trasted this expectation of narrative learning with “political narratives”: this is
at the core of the NPF, which argues that narratives consist both of beliefs and
political narratives tactics (McBeth et al. 2010).
On balance, we have found narratives matter but there is more support for
expectations concerning “political narratives” and political manipulation than for
“narrative learning” as deﬁned above. The data suggest signiﬁcant policy differ-
ences between the American and British cases, and a consequential redeﬁnition
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of the so-called “special relationship” in foreign policy ties between the two
countries.
Methodologically, with our qualitative analysis we have shown that key to the
NPF is a “way of knowing” socially constructed realities grounded in objective
epistemology and social ontology—the key is not the adoption of quantitative
research methods.
Finally, our study shows that the NPF can also be used to evaluate institutions
and for making recommendations. A major theme throughout our analysis has
been the use of experts in public policy. The ﬁndings suggest that, in the political
venues we examined, the use of experts does not correct heuristics. The experts
in our cases do not seem to make an effort to try to offer different story frames
that shape cognition (Jones and Song 2013)—hence they couldn’t possibly ﬁx the
heuristics of politicians. Heuristically misguided and objectively incorrect cogni-
tive shortcuts are frequently invoked, drawing ill-founded similarities between
very different events. The opinions of elected policy makers were highly ﬂuctu-
ating, and in the space of mere months changed from espousing unbridled and
wild optimism to crushing pessimism about the future trajectory of the Arab rev-
olutions. The evidence derived from witnesses is not leading to better informed
or evidence-based discursive policy debate in Washington or London, in the way
intended or expected.
This conclusion on expertise comes with a caveat—we have observed that the
“experts” who provided evidence at the hearings up to a point at least, come from
within the political world. As noted, previous research on the role of scientiﬁc
experts in select committees suggests they can play a challenge function (Dunlop
2013). Future research could usefully apply NPF to a systematic analysis com-
paring science-based with more judgment-based issues such as those found in
foreign policy.
In order to get expertise to correct false heuristics, we need to transform
the foreign policy hearings into a less government-controlled environment. This
implies a more diverse recruitment of the experts. And witnesses should feel free
to criticize and disagree with committee members. We have seen that experts
can be too deferent toward the conventional wisdom embraced by committee
members. The current culture of the committee hearings means that open crit-
icism and opposition to conventional heuristics is seldom voiced. This “soft”
element of reform to the committee system in the US and UK may well be
more challenging to implement than changes to formal powers. However, the
evidence from this study suggests that this issue of witnesses not challeng-
ing the uninformed discursive positions of the politicians is not a remedy, but
rather yet another source of the uninformed and uncertain nature of policy
debate.
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